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Samsung Group’s success cannot be attributed to its corporate governance structure, at 
least thus far. The corporate governance of Samsung has been rather controversial. As the group 
faces the succession issue the corporate governance has become as crucial as their new products 
and services. Samsung has discovered a role model on the other side of the planet, Wallenberg 
Sphere in Sweden. Much effort has been made to learn about Wallenberg’s arrangements and 
key to its success. However, a fundamental difference between the institutions in Sweden and 
Korea has made the corporate structures of the two groups radically different. Wallenberg uses 
the dual-class commons whereas Samsung relies upon the circular shareholdings through 
affiliated firms. This Essay explains and analyzes the two different institutions and corporate 
structures, and argues that the introduction of the dual-class commons in Korea would make the 
corporate governance of Samsung more transparent and efficient, if and only if accompanied by 
Samsung’s commitment to socially responsible corporate citizenship. This Essay also explains 
and analyzes the recent developments in corporate governance of non-banking financial 
institutions in Korea and looks into the issue from the perspective of Samsung’s structure in 
comparison with Wallenberg’s structure. 
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I. Introduction
The Wallenberg Sphere of Sweden and Samsung Group of Korea share 
many things in common. Both are the flagship business conglomerates in 
their respective countries, significantly contributing to each nation’s GDP.1) 
Both of them exercise substantial influence on the politics and society in 
their countries due to the sheer volume of their production capabilities and 
number of employees, suppliers and customers.
From the perspective of corporate governance, they are controlled by 
the members of a family through concentrated ownership and other legal 
and practical arrangements.2) For that reason, along with the economic 
power concentration concern, Wallenberg used to be, and Samsung has 
been highly controversial for many years. And perhaps for that reason 
again, the two groups of companies and their people in charge remain close 
to each other,3) having developed some sort of moral alliance and personal 
friendships. Given that Korea and Sweden historically were not closely 
related to each other, it is remarkable that Wallenberg’s name has become 
quite recognizable in the Korean industry circle, and Samsung is 
responsible for it.
This Essay will explain and briefly analyze the corporate governance 
issues in the two groups from the perspective of comparative corporate 
1) Samsung Group’s some 60 companies, including Samsung Electronics and Samsung 
Life Insurance, accounted for 13% of Korea’s GDP in 2011. See Simon Mundy and Song 
Jung-a, Mighty Samsung Weighs Heavy on S. Korea, Financial Times, Nov. 14, 2012, http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/428f8538-248b-11e2-b38c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3M2KroOGe. 
The Wallenbergs owned some 40% of the value of the listed companies in Sweden by the late 
1990s. See The Wallenbergs: Sweden’s enduring business dynasty, The economisT, Oct. 12, 2006, 
http://www.economist.com/node/8023389.
2) Concentrated ownership has been the hallmark of Asian and European firms. See 
concenTraTed corporaTe oWnership (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). But, current scholarship 
shows us that even in the United States the ownership of large firms is now highly 
concentrated, not with families but with institutional investors. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey 
N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of 
Governance Rights, 113 colum. l. rev. 863 (2013); Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse 
Ownership in the United States, 22 revieW oF Financial sTudies 1377 (2007).
3) See Powerful Swedish Family Arrives in Korea for Conference, The dong-a ilbo, March 18, 
2012, http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2012031922478.
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law, practice, and finance. As a matter of fact, it is not a secret that Samsung 
regards Wallenberg as its model in corporate governance, control, and 
citizenship. In particular, Samsung is interested in learning the way 
Wallenberg managed the corporate social responsibility issue and family 
control succession problem. One of the keys to understanding Wallenberg’s 
“secret of success” lies in Sweden’s corporate governance institutions 
which currently are not available to Samsung as a Korean corporate group. 
This Essay will focus on those differences and propose some institutional 
and practical changes to Samsung as well as the Korean government.
II. The Wallenberg Model4)
1. Corporate Structure
The Swedish model of corporate governance gained much attention 
ever since the comparative corporate governance scholarship was born in 
the United States.5) Ronald Gilson is well known to be a big fan of the 
Swedish model. Gilson designated the Swedish model as an “efficient 
controlling shareholder system,”6) based obviously on the conventional 
wisdom that the controlling (minority) shareholder system7) was not 
efficient.
The hallmark of the Wallenberg corporate structure is its family control 
over the entire group of companies, including such giants as Ericsson, 
Scania and ABB, through the dual-class commons owned by Investor, the 
4) For Wallenberg and Swedish economy in general, see lennarT schön, an economic 
hisTory oF modern sWeden (2012).
5) See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian 
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 sTan. l. rev. 985 
(1993). See also Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden, in a 
hisTory oF corporaTe governance around The World: Family business groups To proFessional 
managers 517 ( 2005).
6) See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 harv. l. rev. 1641 (2006). 
7) For CMS (Controlling Minority Structure), see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, 
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity, in concenTraTed corporaTe oWnership, supra note 2, at 
295. 
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main company. Investor, in turn, is owned by the Wallenberg Foundations 
at 22% in equity and 46% in votes. Gilson even calls the dual-class 
commons structure as the “Swedish capital structure.” In the Swedish 
capital structure “the founders retained stock with many times the voting 
power of the class of common stock sold to the public.”8) The Wallenberg 
family has maintained control over the group through an arrangement that 
creates huge discrepancy between their cash flow right and control right. 
Such a discrepancy typically is characterized as a sign of bad corporate 
governance by most scholarly opinions.9) However, the Wallenberg 
structure is an exception and accepted by the Swedish society largely due to 
Wallenberg’s social commitments and lack of self-dealing and family 
members’ entrenchment. The Wallenberg family controls and runs the 
businesses, but it does not “own” the franchise. No private benefit of 
control is known to be enjoyed by the family.
2. Corporate Citizenship
Much has been written about Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish version of 
Oskar Schindler, who rescued tens of thousands Jews in Nazi-occupied 
Hungary during the later stages of the Second World War.10) The story fits 
very well with the Wallenberg’s image of a conglomerate that has 
consistently tried to resonate with the Swedish society as a socially 
responsible corporate citizen. The Wallenberg Foundations also extensively 
support scientific research, higher education and the arts in Sweden.
The Wallenberg concentrates on such major businesses as aerospace, 
machinery and telecommunications, leaving other areas of business to 
small enterprises.11) It also recognizes the labor union as partner, not party 
8) See Gilson, supra note 6 at 1660. 
9) See, e.g., Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian 
Corporations, 58 Journal oF Financial economics 81 (2000).
10) See, e.g., KaTi marTon, Wallenberg: The incredible True sTory oF The man Who saved 
The JeWs oF budapesT (2011); alex KershaW, The envoy: The epic rescue oF The lasT JeWs oF 
europe in The desperaTe closing monThs oF World War ii (2010).
11) In Korea, big business groups expanded into small areas such as bakeries, restaurants 
and grocery stores. The problem is that those businesses are regularly run by children or 
relatives of controlling-shareholder managers of the business groups. This created outrage in 
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on the other side of the table representing the conflicting interest. This goes 
back to the tri-party Saltsjöbaden Agreement that was signed by Swedish 
Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen: LO) and Swedish 
Employers’ Confede-ration (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen: SAF) on 
December 20, 1938 under the auspices of the government. Instead of 
nationalizing business groups’ assets, the Swedish government and labor 
unions recognized the business groups’ vested interests. Through the 
arrangement, they could keep the big businesses in Swedish territory, and 
gain their support for further social reform. Employers, in return, did agree 
to take higher corporate tax burden. This industrial relations regime did 
survive the far-reaching labor legislation around 1970, and remained 
effective until superseded by the Industrial Agreement of 1997, the new 
labor market regime in Sweden.12)
III. The Samsung Issue in Korea
Corporate governance in Korea has “again” become a hot political and 
social issue. The Korean economy has long been dominated by Chaebols,13) 
large corporate conglomerates, including Samsung Group, throughout its 
past. Although corporate governance of Korean firms in general has 
significantly improved over time, the concentration of economic and even 
political powers on Chaebols have become more intense.14) Samsung stands 
in the middle of controversy. Although Samsung Group is a private 
the public opinion and led to the establishment of the National Commission for Corporate 
Partnership in 2010 under the Daejungsogieop Sangsaeng Chokjine gwanhan beobyul [Law 
for Promotion of Coexistence and Partnership between Big and Small and Medium Size 
Enterprises].
12) See Nils Elvander, Two Labour Market Regimes in Sweden: A Comparison Between the 
Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938 and the Industrial Agreement of 1997, 10 indusTrielle beziehungen 
146 (2003).
13) See Jeong Seo, Who Will Control Frankenstein? The Korean Chaebol’s Corporate Governance, 
14 cardozo J. inT’l & comp. laW 21 (2006);  myung hun Kang, The Korean business 
conglomeraTe: chaebol Then and noW (1996). 
14) See Corporate Kingpins Living on Borrowed Time, Korea Joongang daily, Dec. 7, 2012, 
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2963561 (reporting that 
a total of 30 largest conglomerates accounted for 95% of GDP in 2011).
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business entity comprised of public and private companies, the public, the 
media and politicians closely follow its governance because it has heavy 
impacts on the markets and the nation’s economy.15) Ever since the 2008 
global financial crisis, antagonism amongst general population against 
Chaebols in general16) and Samsung in particular has grown significantly, 
while some corporate scandals and political campaigns did contribute to 
the trend.
1. Succession Problem
The controlling shareholder-managers of many Chaebols face the 
succession problem, with some of them committing questionable acts in the 
succession process causing big scandals and ending up standing before law 
enforcement agencies and courts.17)
The best way to understand Samsung’s issues is probably looking into 
its succession problem. It all starts with Cheil Industries (formerly Samsung 
Everland), a theme park housing lots of zoo animals like lions and tigers. 
Everland practically functions as the holding company of the Samsung 
Group. It controls Samsung Life Insurance, and in turn, the insurance giant 
controls Samsung Electronics, the flagship of the group. According to the 
Financial Times, as of December 2013 Samsung Electronics was the world’s 
thirteenth largest company right after Johnson & Johnson and followed by 
China Mobile. 
Until December 2014, Cheil remained as a private firm owned largely 
by members of the Lee family.18) Cheil is the Samsung version of 
15) Cf. Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 laW and conTemp. probs. 137 
(2011) (discussing increased “publicness” and the role of government in corporate governance 
of large public companies).
16) See, e.g., Simon Munday, South Korean Companies: Needed on the Home Front, Financial 
Times, Nov. 18, 2003, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c63ed192-4bac-11e3-a02f-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3M2KroOGe.
17) See Hwa-Jin Kim, Seung-Hwan Lee & Stephen Woodcock, Favoritism and Corporate 
Law: The Confused Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in the Hyundai Motor Case, 3 michigan 
business & enTrepreneurial laW revieW 41 (2013).
18) The average ownership of the controlling shareholders of non-public member firms of 
Samsung Group was 78.43%, whereas their cash-flow rights were as low as 19.43%. For public 
member firms the number was 13.52% and 1.14%, respectively. See James Jinho Chang & 
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Wallenberg’s Investor. So, if control over Cheil gets passed on, the control 
over the whole group passes on. The question is to whom. Samsung’s 
Chairman Lee has three children, a son and two daughters. They hold 
controlling shares in Cheil and some shares in other affiliate companies of 
the group. In 1996, an important decision was made. Where Cheil 
(Everland) offered a substantial amount of convertible bonds to the 
shareholders with preemptive rights. Almost all of the shareholders turned 
down the offer. Everland then “found” willing buyers from outside, Lee’s 
children. The son got the lion’s share and became the new largest 
shareholder in Everland. It seemed as if control over the group had been 
smoothly passed on to the son. However, the story had a surprising twist.
Five years after the transaction, some 43 law professors brought 
criminal charges against the Everland managers. They thought that the 
price of convertible bonds was too low, resulting in a very cheap transfer of 
corporate control to the son to the detriment of the company’s financials. 
After years of a lengthy and painful courtroom debacle, the Korean 
Supreme Court ultimately decided, by a five to four judgment, that the 
defendants were not guilty.19) The Supreme Court’s judgment made the 
son’s control over Everland legitimate, but the control and succession issue 
has not been solved yet.
The ultimate trouble is that the whole corporate structure of the 
Samsung Group has been built on the roundabout circular shareholding.20) 
Samsung Life controls Samsung Electronics, which controls Samsung Card, 
and Samsung Card in turn holds a sizable share in Samsung Life.21) It is 
now too big an entity for a family to maintain effective control without such 
an arrangement. It is almost like the Lee family controls the entire group 
Hyun-Han Shin, Family Ownership and Performance in Korean Conglomerates, 15 paciFic-basin 
Finance Journal 329 (2007).
19) Supreme Court [S.Ct], 2005No2371, May 29, 2009 (S. Kor.). The entire judgment is 
available in Kim hWa-Jin, gieobJibaeguJoWa gieobgeumyung [corporaTe Finance and 
governance] 462-482 (2d ed., 2012) (S. Kor.). 
20) See generally, Chun Kyung-Hoon, Sunhwanchuljaui Beobjeog Munje [Legal Issues of the 
Circular Ownership], 32-1 sangsabeobyeongu [commercial laW revieW] 97 (2013) (S. Kor.).
21) This structure comes up in the United States, too. See Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001 
(Del. Ch. 1987). In Germany, they call it “Ringförmige Mehrheitsbeteiligungen.” See Friedrich 
Kübler, gesellschaFTsrechT 362 (5th ed. 1998) (suggesting potential liability of directors who 
created the structure).
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through other people’s money. On top of that, as Chairman Lee gets older, 
his two ambitious daughters may require their fair shares in the group. 
Also, they will have to pay inheritance taxes through selling the shares. To 
make the matter more difficult, two financial institutions, Samsung Life and 
Samsung Card, are involved in the structure, which invites political 
interference and, accordingly, makes the whole issue more difficult to 
solve.
2. Social Responsibility
From the perspective of stakeholder capitalism,22) Samsung’s track 
record does not look that impressive. The most notable example is 
Samsung’s decades long policy against labor unions. Also, its history has 
been tainted with such scandals as tax evasions and corrupt practices.23) 
Chairman Lee once stepped down from his office when the former general 
counsel of the group spoke out after the former public prosecutor met with 
some Catholic priests.24) A special prosecutor was appointed by the 
parliament, found some wrongdoings and indicted Lee. Samsung was 
forced to pledge for socially responsible management and committed a 
significant amount of funds for that purpose. This is the point where 
Samsung became eager to learn from Wallenberg’s experiences. 
The Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance25) adopted by the 
Korean Committee on Corporate Governance in September 1999 declares 
that “[t]he corporation shall not be negligent in its social responsibilities, 
22) See generally, Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial 
Autonomyand Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 harv. inT’l l.J. 129 
(2009); lynn sTouT, The shareholder value myTh (2012). 
23) The family has also been involved in an inheritance dispute. See Court Sides with 
Samsung Electronics Chairman in Family Feud, Wall sTreeT Journal, Feb. 1, 2013, http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323701904578277002155753668; Feud Among Samsung 
Descendants Heats Up, neW yorK Times, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/ 
15/business/global/feud-among-samsung-descendants-heats-up.html. 
24) He even wrote a book on his experiences in Samsung. Kim Yong Chul, samseongeul 
saenggaghanda [ThinKing samsung] (2010) (S. Kor.).
25) gieobJibaeguJoWon [commiTTee on corporaTe governance], gieobJibaeguJo 
mobeomgyuJun [code oF besT pracTice For corporaTe governance] (Sept. 1999) (S. Kor.) 
[hereinafter The Code].
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such as consumer protection and environmental protection.”26) Actually, the 
notion that corporations are socially responsible27) was already widespread 
and well accepted under the authoritarian military governments from the 
1960s through the 1980s. This notion is also related to the popular concept 
that socially responsible and “patriotic” business managers greatly 
contribute to the economic development of their “fatherland.”
Socially responsible companies have been popular in Korea along the 
way. For instance, pharmaceutical companies act and present themselves 
almost like charitable institutions. Big companies build hospitals, museums 
and schools and establish endowments.28) Samsung also runs one of the 
finest hospitals in Korea. Cheil, together with Samsung Life, has a guide 
dogs program with many labrador retrievers. Whenever a national disaster 
occurs, the media enthusiastically reports on contributions made by the 
companies with references to the amounts contributed, sometimes ranked 
by size. The websites of major corporations in Korea, including those of 
Samsung and LG, very proudly introduce how they value the concept of 
corporate social responsibility and that their performance has been in line 
with such a concept. 
On the other hand, there were and are many controlling shareholder-
managers in Korea who voluntarily assume unlimited responsibility for 
their companies. They take the financial responsibility of their firms on 
themselves by issuing guarantees for the firms’ debt, and by other methods, 
26) Id. Section IV-1.3 (“With the significant rise of corporation’s influence on the economy 
and society, similarly increasing has been the recognition of general public’s concern about 
corporation’s social responsibilities. Also, consumers and regional societies have been 
increasing in importance as interested parties in the continuance of the corporation. In 
particular, if the corporation neglects its social responsibilities, such as protecting consumer 
rights or the environment using its vantage, it will, unlike the past, lead to a very adverse 
effect on its long-term development as well as to a decline in its image. Therefore, each 
corporation shall enable its managers to faithfully perform its social responsibilities through 
an appropriate governance system.”).
27) See generally Stephen J. Brammer & Stephen Pavelin, Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, in The oxFord handbooK oF corporaTe governance 719 (Mike 
Wright et al. eds., 2013).
28) Like Wallenbergs did, some of the endowments and foundations were used to place 
part of a controlling block of shares in friendly hands. Such a practice was also popular 
because it could mitigate the inheritance tax burden without diluting control. The Korean 
government took some measures to curb the practice in 1997 through a tax law reform.
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voluntarily giving up the benefit of the limited liability principle as they 
put their personal properties into the corporation when the firm is in 
trouble to save the firm and employees’ jobs and even compensate for 
losses incurred by the firm’s customers. This would be surprising if it were 
to happen in a Fortune 500 International public firm.29)
However, most legal scholars in Korea are skeptical about bringing the 
concept of corporate social responsibility into a statute.30) Corporate social 
responsibility, however good it may be, may become a simple “guidance” 
that does not help judges.31) It is argued that it is not clear who is the legal 
beneficiary of the directors’ obligation to act in a socially responsible way. 
Also, such a law may be abused under sensitive and unstable political 
circumstances. Management might use the concept to sacrifice shareholder 
interests.32) Korean corporate law as it stands today does not provide the 
non-shareholder stakeholders of a corporation with any kind of legal right 
as far as corporate governance is concerned. Non-shareholder stakeholders 
can only protect their legitimate interests through contract, tax and labor 
law.33)
Korea is currently also under the strong influence of the paradigm 
29) Also, Korean banks usually require the controlling-shareholder managers and other 
key officers to issue personal guarantees for a firm’s debts. The Korean banking practice 
heavily relies upon secured lending. If the firm fails, the controlling-shareholder manager 
loses everything, unless he or she runs some kind of safety funds.
30) See, e.g., lee chul song, hoesabeob gangui [corporaTe laW] 66-67 (20th ed. 2012) (S. 
Kor.).
31) But see William T. allen eT al., commenTaries and cases on The laW oF business 
organizaTion 232 (4th ed. 2012) (“[T]here is social value to announcing a standard.. that is not 
enforced with a liability rule.”).
32) In Japan, the House of Representatives resolved twice (in 1973 and 1981) to require the 
government to codify the concept, but nothing happened. See Lee, supra note 30, at 66.
33) See Section IV-1.2 of The Code: “The corporation shall make every effort to maintain 
and improve labor conditions by faithfully observing labor-related statutes such as the Labor 
Standard Act.” See also Section IV-2.1 of The Code: “The form and level of management 
monitoring by creditors shall be determined through discussion among the related parties, 
according to the corporation’s distinctive qualities.” The Korean Act on Worker Participation 
and Promotion of Cooperation is basically a labor law statute that enforces convening of 
labor-management consultative meetings, during which employers are required to report and 
explain the business plans/strategies, matters concerning their implementation, quarterly 
production plans and performances, personnel plans, and the corporation’s financial status. 
So, it cannot be compared with the German co-determination.
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change that took place after the global financial crisis and ‘Occupy Wall 
Street’ campaign. In the presidential election of 2012, all candidates 
promised to do something about the current model of economy. The 
discussion of corporate social responsibility has regained the focus in the 
context of ‘economic democracy.’ As the biggest business entity in Korea, 
Samsung is under pressure and should come up with a new idea and 
policy that may satisfactorily answer the requirements newly made by 
Korean society.
3. The Case for Dual-Class Commons
The dual-class common stock structure, or the “Swedish capital 
structure” as Gilson puts it, is popular in Europe34) but it is also widely used 
in the United States35) in the big public companies as well as venture capital-
backed companies undergoing IPOs.36) The most well-known example of 
the concentrated ownership with the dual-class structure in the U.S. is 
Berkshire Hathaway, one of the most profitable and respected firms in the 
world.37) The difference between Berkshire, Wallenberg and Samsung is 
that Berkshire is under the control of individual managers led by Warren 
Buffett,38) not families. The enterprise has neither been inherited nor faces 
the bloodline succession problem.
The dual-class structure is regarded as an antitakeover arrangement,39) 
34) iss europe, ecgi, shearman & sTerling, reporT on The proporTionaliTy principle in The 
european union (May 18, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/
docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf. 
35) See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of 
Shareholder Choice, 76 caliF. l. rev. 1 (1988).
36) See, e.g., Laura Field & Jonathan Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 Journal oF 
Finance 1857 (2002).
37) By conventional standards, the corporate governance of Berkshire cannot be 
positively evaluated. The gap between cash flow right and control right is big. Its aging board 
does not look that independent, etc. Perhaps, the firm represents the extremely rare 
benevolent dictatorship model that makes all discussions trivial.
38) See alice schroeder, The snoWball: Warren buFFeTT and The business oF liFe (2009).
39) See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 u. 
pa. l. rev. 713 (2003); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm 
Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.l. econ. & org. 83 (2001); Michael Klausner, Fact 
and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 sTan. l. rev. 1325, 1332-1336 (2013) (discussing 
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but that is not all that it does. The dual class share system is relatively more 
transparent compared to cross-shareholdings or pyramid type structures.40) 
If the dual-class stock system is abolished, the relevant companies will 
restructure the corporate governance through adopting cross-shareholding 
or creating a pyramid to protect its incumbent manager’s vested interests.41)
One of the reasons that the Korean Chaebols use complicated 
shareholding structures is a legal one. The Korean Commercial Code 
(hereinafter KCC) does not allow firms to issue dual-class common stocks. 
The one-share-one-vote rule in the KCC42) has been regarded as mandatory 
and, may not be opted out through charter provisions. Large Korean firms 
have been growing so rapidly that the controlling shareholder-managers 
could not keep up with the speed of their firms’ growths. In order to avoid 
the dilution of their shareholding, they built the massive circular 
shareholding structures and inter-locking directorships. They control 
practically one business entity with very little direct investment. Ironically, 
the ban on dual-class commons has made the corporate structure of Korean 
conglomerates less transparent. 
Like it or not, Samsung Group’s future may determine at least the near 
future of the Korean economy. Together with Hyundai Motor Company 
Group, Samsung is the only Korean business organization that remains 
competitive in the ever challenging global markets. If one does not wish 
Samsung’s failure due to its corporate governance issues, and given that 
the staggered board).
40) Hwa-Jin Kim, The Case for Market for Corporate Control in Korea, 8 Journal oF Korean 
laW 227, 273 (2008) (S. Kor.).
41) See Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, A Threat to Dual-Class Shares, Financial Times, May 
31, 2002, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/FT.Dual.Class.Share.2002.
pdf. But see Ronald Masuliset al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 Journal oF 
Finance (2009) (finding evidence supporting the hypothesis that managers with greater 
control rights in excess of cash-flow rights are more likely to pursue private benefits at the 
expense of outside shareholders).
42) Sangbeob [Commercial Act], art. 369, para. 1 (S. Kor.). For the rule, see generally 
Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, One Share – One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 
Journal oF Financial economics 175 (1988); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders 
and Corporate Control, 94 Journal oF poliTical economy 461 (1986); Shaun Martin & Frank 
Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 u. ill. l. rev. 775 (2005). See also Bernard Black & Reinier 
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 harv. l. rev. 1911, 1945-1946 (1996) 
(finding that the one share one vote regime has value).
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Samsung itself cannot solve the problems they have satisfactorily, 
legislative measures will become inevitable to the extent that they do not 
violate the constitution and fundamental principle of economic justice. 
Introduction of the dual-class commons into the KCC may well contribute 
to the solution under the condition that Samsung follows suit of 
Wallenberg in terms of corporate citizenship.
To be sure, it is beyond the scope of this Essay to figure out how 
Samsung may use the dual-class commons in its restructuring, if 
introduced. It may use methods such as conventional coercive exchange 
offers43) and adding new classes.44) Numerous factors shall be taken into 
account in such a restructuring and unforeseen barriers may also come up 
with any plan. The Korea Exchange listing rules may also become an issue 
when a dual-class recapitalization causes the reduction or restriction of 
existing shareholder voting rights.45) The current rules, of course, do not 
know of the dual-class recapitalization. Nevertheless, it is certain that 
Samsung may enjoy more flexibility benefiting the new legal environment. 
Perhaps, the holding structure — as discussed below — with a dual-class 
regime comparable to Investor in the Wallenberg Sphere may provide 
Samsung with a good example.
On a different note, the dual-class scheme may provide the capital 
markets with new energy and liquidity that would contribute to the 
investor protection. The historic IPO of Alibaba in September of 2014 
reignited discussions on the dual-class commons in that context. The Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) lost the USD25 billion deal to the New York 
Stock Exchange46) through standing by its one-share-one-vote rule.47) The 
43) See, e.g., Richard S. Ruback, Coercive Dual-Class Exchange Offers, 20 Journal oF 
Financial economics 153 (1988).
44) See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, 
dealbooK, Apr. 13, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-gives-
google-founders-tighter-control/?_r=0.
45) Cf. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313 (2014); NASDAQ Listing Rules § IM-5640 
(2014).
46) See NYSE to Run Software Tests for Trading Firms Ahead of Alibaba IPO, neW yorK Times, 
July 1, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/01/us-ice-nyse-alibaba-group-
idUSKBN0F64X920140701.
47) Cf.  Hong Kong Stock Exchange Main Board Listing Rules § 8.11 (2014).  See Paul 
Davies, Alibaba’s Demands Have Echoes in Hong Kong’s History, Financial Times, Oct. 2, 2013, 
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HKEx has now indicated that it would consider relaxing the rule as it may 
lose a generation of companies from China’s new economy by sticking to 
the current rule.48) It also is worth noting that the securities regulation and 
stock exchange rules are not just consumer protection norms. Stock 
exchanges and financial services industries of the world are under intense 
pressure from global competition, and the capital market laws of the world 
could not afford to ignore it.49) Korea is no exception.
IV. Industry and Finance
The Wallenberg Sphere structured the group into two segments, i.e., 
financial group and non-financial operational group. The two groups are 
controlled by Investor, but managed independently. On the finance side, 
now almost 160 year old bank Enskilda Banken (SEB) is in charge. The 
Wallenberg established Investor for SEB’s holdings some one hundred 
years ago, when the law restricted bank ownership of shares in industrial 
firms.
ht tp ://www.f t . com/int l/cms/s/0/008fc fac -29b3-11e3-bbb8-00144feab7de .
html#axzz3M2KroOGe.
48) At the end of the day though, instead of offering dual-class commons, Alibaba came 
up with an even questionable arrangement from the perspective of shareholder right. What 
investors actually purchased are shares in a Cayman Islands entity called Alibaba Group 
Holding Limited. The actual business entity in China is contractually obliged to give the 
Cayman corporation 100% of the profits which are only enforceable in a Chinese court. See 
Shareholder Rights: Out of Control, The economisT, Sept. 20, 2014, http://www.economist.com/
node/21618889 (“More of the world’s big stock markets are allowing firms like Alibaba to 
sideline their shareholders”); See also Lucian Bebchuk, Alibaba’s Governance Leaves Investors at a 
Disadvantage, dealbooK, Sept. 16, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/alibabas-
governance-leaves-investors-at-a-disadvantage/. 
49) Kim hWa-Jin, JabonsiJangbeob ilon [TheoreTical FoundaTions oF securiTies regulaTion] 
3-4 (2014) (S. Kor.).  See also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of 
Securities Regulation, 55 duKe l.J. 711, 713 (2006);  Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, 
Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 n.y.u.  l. rev. 761, 802 (1985); 
barbara gruneWald & michael schliTT, einFührung in das KapiTalmarKTrechT 3 (3d. ed. 2014); 
peTra bucK-heeb, KapiTalmarKTrechT 3-7 (6th ed. 2013).
 Concentrated Ownership and Corporate Control   |  53No. 1: 2014
1. The Issue
As mentioned above, the typical Korean conglomerate structure, 
including that of Samsung, is characterized by cross as well as circular 
shareholdings amongst affiliated companies. Many of them are private 
companies about which not much information is available to the outside. 
These firms conduct significant volumes of related party transactions.50) 
However, what if the related party transactions were to take place 
involving financial institutions?
Ownership in Korean commercial banks is highly dispersed. Major 
banks are owned by foreign investors with no controlling interest. Under 
the Banking Act, there is a ten percent basic ceiling on bank ownership by a 
single shareholder.51) It is understood that the ceiling was introduced to 
effectively bar the Chaebols’, in particular Samsung’s, ownership in 
commercial banks. The only issue is that the government exercises a huge 
influence on the corporate governance of banks.52) On the other hand, non-
banking financial institutions in Korea are members of big corporate 
groups, the Chaebols. The ownership in such financial institutions, securities 
firms, insurance companies, and savings banks, etc., is concentrated. They 
are under the control of controlling shareholder-managers or affiliated 
firms which again are controlled by families or individuals. The trouble is 
that the non-banking financial institutions have other important 
stakeholders besides managers, employees and shareholders, i.e., customers 
and taxpayers. The deposit insurance program also applies to the 
institutions. Moral hazard and conflict of interests as exemplified by recent 
50) See Kim et al., supra note 17, at 44-49 (Hyundai Motor Group case); Son Young Hoa, 
Gieobjibdannae Naebugeolaee gwanhan yeongu [Studies on the Internal Transaction in Corporate 
Group], 32-1 sangsabeobyeongu [commercial laW revieW] 159 (2013). See generally Gerard 
Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions, in The anaTomy oF corporaTe laW 101 
(2004).
51) Eunhaengbeob [Banking Act], art. 15, para. 1 (S. Kor.).
52) Hwa-Jin Kim, Taking International Soft Law Seriously: Its Implications for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance, 1 Journal oF Korean laW 1 (2001) (S. Kor.);  Hwa-Jin Kim, 
Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial 
Institutions in Korea, 17 berKeley J. inT’l l. 61 (1999).
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scandals53) should be addressed through proper corporate governance 
arrangements and financial regulations.
The Korean government and law makers have been struggling with the 
issue of ‘separation of industry and finance.’54) The core of the discussion is 
if the law should ban industrial firms’ control over financial firms, i.e., 
whether Korea should ban or restrict ownership in non-banking financial 
institutions by operational companies in corporate groups which are 
controlled by families. The concern here is that industrial firms may abuse 
financial firms, and their investors and customers, for the benefit of their 
shareholders, including the controlling shareholder and his or her family 
members. Again, Samsung is in the middle of the controversy because 
Samsung Group comprises of financial and non-financial operational firms 
under the ultimate control of a family.
2. Pros and Cons
Opinions favoring the separation are based on mistrust in the financial 
supervisory system. As a matter of fact, the savings bank scandal and the 
recent failure of some non-banking financial institutions support the 
validity of the claim for separation. Ex post regulation cannot be trusted. 
53) The savings banks scandal in 2011 was a reincarnation of the savings and loans 
scandals in the United States in 1990s. The controlling shareholder-managers of the troubled 
savings banks simply stole money from their banks due to the lack of stringent supervision. 
Briberies were also involved in some cases. Reform efforts have largely been unsuccessful due 
to lobbies to the lawmakers. But, most savings banks were not members of big corporate 
groups. Recent scandals involve member firms of big corporate groups. One such example is 
Tongyang Group, which failed in 2013. It turned out that Tongyang Securities sold corporate 
bonds issued by ailing affiliates to its customers assuring that the issuers were sound. Many 
customers were attracted by an unusually high interest rate, so they were aware of the 
potential risks, but apparently took the risk believing in ‘too big to fail.’ See Tongyang 
Investigation Widens, Korea Joongang daily, Oct. 8, 2013, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.
com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2978544&ref=mobile. Hyosung Group currently is under 
criminal investigation, but it appears that they used the group’s member capital company like 
a controlling shareholder family’s private cash register. See Prosecution Has Something to Prove, 
Korea Joongang daily, Oct. 15, 2013, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/
Article.aspx?aid=2978810.
54) See generally Kim yong Jae, eunhaengbeobWonlon [banKing laW and regulaTion] 96-194 
(2d ed. 2012) (S. Kor.).
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But, the core of the pro-separation arguments is the conflicts of interest. 
Families in control of the group and/or operational member firms of the 
group may harm the financial firm through tunneling and/or unfairly 
favoring member firms within the group, its customers and eventually 
taxpayers along with systemic risk. Also, a separation may facilitate fair 
competition between corporate groups with and without financial firms.
Opinions against the separation, on the other hand, emphasize that no 
country regulates ex ante the new entry into the non-banking industry. 
Prudential rules and tight financial supervision will ensure the soundness 
of the financial institution. And, as far as economic rational is concerned, a 
similar argument favoring the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933 applies here, i.e., separation blocks the creation of economies of scale 
and scope and prevents conglomerates from enjoying the financial synergy 
with stable cash flow. As a result it may have adverse impact on the 
international competitiveness of the local financial institutions and 
consumer benefits.55) The argument also points out that the Korean banks 
ended up being owned by foreign investors due to the ban on ownership of 
Chaebols in commercial banks. The same thing can happen to the non-
banking financial institutions if more structural regulation is added. 
Regarding the possibility that operational firms may abuse financial firms, 
they emphasize that the reality usually works the other way around. 
Operational firms within a group support financial firms through 
providing business opportunities arising from the operational firms.56)
The Korean legislature has been discussing the periodic review on 
controlling shareholders’ personal records. If proven that the controlling 
55) For the discussion, see Hwa-Jin Kim, A Global Structural Regulation of Financial 
Institutions?, 52-4 seouldaehaggyo beobhag [seoul laW Journal] 169, 180-185 (2011) (S. Kor.); 
Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 harvard business laW 
revieW 39 (2011); Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd–Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: 
Strengths, Challenges and Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29 yale J. on reg. 181, 
194 (2012); Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz–
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 yale l.J. 1368, 1409-1410 (2011).
56) This is actually perceived to be the bigger problem in Korea. Financial member firms 
rely too heavily upon businesses supplied by non-financial firms so that their identity and 
competitiveness as financial institutions can be compromised. It also has negative impacts on 
those firms’ relationship with general consumers. The Korean government has recently issued 
guiding rules for related-party transactions involving financial institutions.
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shareholder or his/her relatives did commit crime or wrongdoing, the 
controlling shareholder shall lose control over the firm through voting right 
restriction or administrative order to dispose of the shares in the firm in the 
stock market. Besides the question of whether such a drastic measure 
would survive the constitutional law challenge, the financial services 
industry strongly opposes the legislative move arguing that the corporate 
governance of non-financial institutions can be determined by factors that 
lie beyond the scope of practical control of controlling shareholders. If 
adopted, the new rule can in fact be easily abused by competitors and even 
unfriendly or hostile family members or relatives.57) Furthermore, in a 
situation where the controlling shareholder is another company, the 
corporate governance of certain financial institutions will end up being 
changed by acts of another company’s employees. 
3. Holding Structure Solution
The compromising idea in discussion is lifting the ban on general 
holding company’s ownership in financial institutions. Under the current 
Anti-monopoly and Fair Trade Act,58) a general holding company may not 
control financial firms while financial holding companies are allowed to do 
it.59) As an operating subsidiary cannot control financial subsidiaries in a 
holding structure the separation of industry and finance can practically be 
achieved. In this scenario the whole Samsung Group transforms itself into a 
holding structure following the example of LG Group and SK Group, 
among others, and can keep Samsung Life and other nine financial entities 
within the group.
57) See Geumyungsa Daejuju Jeoggyeogseong Simsa Hwagdae [Expanding Periodic Review for 
controlling shareholders of financial institutions], Korea economic daily, June 14, 2013, http://
www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2013061437531.
58) Dokjeomgyuje mit Gongjeonggeoraee gwanhan beobyul [Monopoly Regulation and 
Fair Trade Act], art. 8-2, para. 3, no. 3 (S. Kor.).
59) The law did ban the establishment of a holding company whose primary purpose was 
to control the management of a domestic company through equity ownership. The policy was 
dropped in 1999 to help big corporate groups ease the restructuring and improvement of 
corporate governance. For the regulation of financial holding companies (in the U.S.), see 
Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 harv. l. rev. 
507 (1994).
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Another idea is the mezzanine (financial) holding company. According 
to this, general holding companies shall be allowed to control mezzanine 
holding companies that may own financial institutions.60) Mezzanine 
holding companies will become subject to strengthened financial 
supervision. This scenario offers a less expensive way for Samsung to deal 
with the issue because it does not require the restructuring of the entire 
group. In any case, the dual-class commons regime as in the Investor and 
SEB relationship in the Wallenberg Sphere would be the practical solution 
especially because it is likely that the Korean government would allow the 
dual-class regime only to private companies, if at all.61)
4. The Perils of Over-Regulation
It is a very common phenomenon throughout history that politicians 
and government officials supported by scholars and other experts try to 
change or reform the existing system whenever a scandal takes place. 
Sometimes it comes with significant regulatory costs. One of the most 
recent examples is arguably the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,62) and the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 may become another example.63) On the one hand, 
it is a constructive approach. Things must be fixed if they are broken. On 
the other hand, they easily forget that scandals always involve illegal and 
criminal acts of those people who are responsible for damages to investors, 
60) See Yeo, Jjunggan Geumyungjijusa doib jaechujin [Ruling Party to push for mezzanine 
financial holding company], chosun biz, Nov. 24, 2014, http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2014/11/24/2014112402891.html (reporting that the ruling party was ready to push the 
bill).
61) See the draft article by the Korean Ministry of Justice’s expert group in Kim, supra note 
40 at 274.
62) For critical assessments, see Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a 
Future?, 26 yale J. on reg. 229 (2009); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making 
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 yale l.J. 1521 (2005); William J. Carney, The Costs of Being 
Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,” 55 emory l.J. 141 (2006). But, see 
Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 mich. l. rev. 1817 (2007).
63) See, e.g., Diane Katz, Dodd-Frank at Year Three: Onerous and Costly (Heritage 
Foundation, Heritage Issue Brief No. 3993, July 19, 2013); Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, 
Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 sTanFord laW revieW 
online (2013), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/dodd-frank-
regulators-cost-benefit-analysis-and-agency-capture.
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shareholders, and the economy. It is true that Korean firms may take 
advantage of the financial affiliates in bad times. However, policy should 
not be formulated on a worst case and/or isolated scenario. It is like 
unfairly punishing honest firms for acts committed by the bad guys. It may 
also invite opportunistic behavior and corruptive practices in bureaucracy 
out of the labyrinth of regulatory and supervisory details that ultimately 
create further reform needs.64)
It has been discussed in the parliament that Samsung Life’s voting 
rights in Samsung Electronics should be restricted through amending the 
Anti-monopoly and Fair Trade Act. How the idea survives the 
constitutional law challenge is not an issue for politicians. The 
Constitutional Court of Korea has become the most active constitutional 
law court in the world reviewing and overturning unconstitutional laws 
passed by the Korean parliament. When Samsung Life in fact gets 
separated from the Samsung Group structure, the family control over the 
group may become weak. There is no way for the family to maintain 
effective control over Samsung Electronics, the world’s thirteenth largest 
firm, without the ‘assistance’ of Samsung Life. This puts Samsung in the 
awkward position that it seems to oppose or resist the government policy. 
As a result, the whole discussion on the separation of industry and finance 
has somehow become a Samsung issue which is misleading and 
unfortunate. The lawmakers seem to try to avoid such an impression, but it 
is obvious simply because the Samsung issue stands out in any discussion.
V. Concluding Remarks
As Gilson observed, “the presence of family ownership.. facilitates the 
development and maintenance of the reputation necessary for a 
corporation’s commercial success “in a bad commercial law environment.65) 
The best example is the Wallenberg Sphere in Sweden, a Scandinavian legal 
64) See Kim hWa-Jin, geumyungui samseongJeonJa [a samsung elecTronics in Finance] 124-
126 (2014) (S. Kor.).
65) See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring 
Relational Exchange, 60 sTan. l. rev. 633, 636 (2007). 
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system jurisdiction.66) The family business has successfully survived five 
generations. The same history of success may repeat in Korea. The first step 
would be to remove widespread biases against family-controlled corporate 
groups with concentrated ownership by accepting the proposition that they 
may be efficient as well.
This Essay examined the controversial corporate governance issues of 
Samsung Group in comparison with those of the Wallenberg Sphere. The 
core difference between the structure and problems arising there from is 
the use of the dual-class commons in Wallenberg. Korean law does not 
allow the dual-class commons, so Samsung relies heavily upon circular 
shareholding through affiliated firms. This Essay concludes that the 
introduction of the dual-class commons in the KCC would ease the pain in 
difficult corporate governance problems Samsung and other Korean firms 
face should the Wallenberg model be a legitimate one for the Korean 
economy and society. This Essay also emphasizes that such a change may 
be legitimate if and only if Korean firms commit socially responsible 
corporate citizenship.
Finally, the policy issue in Korea now is whether stronger regulation on 
governance of corporate groups with non-banking financial institutions is 
in order. Samsung is in the middle of the controversy. Special legislative 
initiatives have also been taken to address the issue. This Essay briefly 
explained and analyzed the recent developments in corporate governance 
of non-banking financial institutions in Korea and suggested that further 
regulation would not be efficient and rather produce bureaucracy and 
corruptive practices. If Samsung did not cause the controversy, it is fair to 
say Samsung may be counted as collateral damage.
66) For discussions on the family-controlled U.S. firms, see Danny Miller et al., Are Family 
Firms Really Superior Performers?, 13 Journal oF corporaTe Finance 829 (2007) (“Although 
international evidence suggests that families may be unhelpful to firm performance, recent 
analyses of U.S. public companies indicate that family firms outperform.”) See also, Belen 
Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm 
Value?, 80 Journal oF Financial economics 385 (2006).
